Presupposing independence

Pierre Graveline, the editor of Le Devoir, a staunch sovereigntist, published yesterday and today a two-part open letter to Duceppe and Landry regarding his 30-step, 10-priority programme for capitalising on Adscam and leading, ultimately, to a separate Québec.  Some of the proposals are very interesting.  Here's some exceprts from the first part of the article that I think are quite instructive.

Le Devoir: Lettre ouverte à Gilles Duceppe et Bernard Landry - Dix priorités et 30 actions souveraines - 1:Troisième action souveraine, deux mandats seront confiés aux ministres :
- créer au sein de chaque ministère, organisme public ou société d'État un secrétariat à la souveraineté et libérer à cette fin des ressources substantielles;
- élaborer en priorité des plans d'action prévoyant, sans égard à la répartition des pouvoirs constitutionnels, les interventions à faire pour répondre aux besoins du Québec, établissant les budgets nécessaires et ciblant les lois et les mesures à mettre en application dès la proclamation de l'indépendance.

This appears under the first priority, and is the third "sovereign action" of a putative next PQ government (quite likely due to the depths of Charest's unpopularity): fully using the resources of the Québec state apparatus in order to fulfill the objective.  In this case, he plans to establish, as soon as possible, offices within every ministry to use public funds to promote sovereignty and set up the ministries to accomodate and assume a sovereign Québec.  Later,

En conséquence, le gouvernement réalisera une neuvième action souveraine. Il annoncera que le Québec se retire de toutes les instances politiques fédérales-provinciales existantes (sauf le Parlement fédéral, où les députés du Bloc resteront en fonction) et qu'il entend désormais ne discuter que de nation à nation avec le Canada, dans le cadre de rencontres entre les deux premiers ministres. Cette décision fera l'objet d'une résolution de l'Assemblée nationale afin de lui donner la portée politique qu'elle mérite.

So long as Québec is a part of Canada, dealing with the federal government will be unavoidable, he recognizes.  But this must be done on a nation-to-nation basis.  In other words, in the interim before sovereignty, he would impose on the other provinces what wasn't accepted at Meech: their effective relative demotion in federal-provincial affairs.  Obviously, any potential backlash from this is a feature, not a bug.  Québec should immediately cease to participate in any federal-provincial initiatives.   This is because of the "oppression" of federal interference in what he believes should be the powers of Québec, which he mentions slightly earlier---any possibility of the practical efficacy of such arrangements is simply not considered.  Of course, he must consider this encroachment to be absolute, since he does not even recognize the Constitution of 1982---obviously.   Later, he moves on to such things as already setting up diplomatic recognition of Québec presumably long before Québec is sovereign.

And in the second part of the article:

Le Devoir: Lettre ouverte à Gilles Duceppe et Bernard Landry - Dix priorités et 30 actions souveraines - 2:  Le gouvernement réalisera aussi une vingt-deuxième action souveraine en créant un bureau d'information publique sur la souveraineté et en le dotant du budget nécessaire pour communiquer directement aux citoyens l'information pertinente sur les actions gouvernementales préparant la souveraineté. Le bureau subventionnera également les activités de la coalition citoyenne pour la souveraineté. Vingt-troisième action souveraine, le gouvernement confiera au même bureau le mandat de mener à bien une campagne d'information internationale sur la souveraineté du Québec.

Enfin, vingt-quatrième action souveraine, la coalition citoyenne lancera un hebdomadaire souverainiste à grand tirage. Subventionné par l'État québécois, par ses organismes et ses sociétés, mettant à contribution les figures de proue du mouvement souverainiste, cet outil d'information contribuera puissamment à contrebalancer l'influence des médias fédéralistes.

This part of the plan is very interesting.  It proposes...a sponsorship programme.  Of course, the entire article is cast in the context of Adscam: the federal government is willing to go to any lengths to subvert democracy in Québec, so a PQ "provincial" government must be willing to respond in kind. The irony of this is that the justification of the sponsorship programme (leaving out Adscam) is precisely that under any Québec government, nationalists use the apparatus of the state to negate the possibility of a Canadian identity for Québécois. 

But this proposal is much more far-reaching than the federal sponsorship programme: it actually involves setting up potemkin sovereigntist media.  This is proposed under the assumption that the media in Québec is overwhelmingly federalist.  This proposition is regularly disputed by federalists in Québec, possibly correctly.  In fact, this was yet again another justification for the federal sponsorship programme.  And, of course, he is the editor of Le Devoir.

Though he complains about "oppression," (in the administrative encroachments of the federal government, he says,

De plus, en vue de prémunir la démocratie québécoise contre toute tentative de déstabilisation, le gouvernement réalisera une vingt-sixième action souveraine en déclarant, à la veille de la campagne référendaire, que, tout en respectant strictement la liberté d'expression des citoyens, il ne tolérera aucune action mettant en danger la paix sociale, mettant en péril l'économie québécoise ou mettant en cause l'intégrité territoriale du Québec. Il donnera mandat à la Sûreté du Québec d'agir en conséquence.

Fine, he is against putting social peace in danger.  But even as he says that he is in favour of free expression during a referendum campaign, he would make it illegal to threaten the territorial integrity of Québec during the campaign.  This is obviously intended to threaten communities in Québec that see Canada as their nation and would choose the option to stay with it if Québec goes.  This is one of the characteristics of the sovereigntist movement that I am least impressed by: they complain of the encroachment of the federal state, but as soon as they have control over the provincial state, well, that is inviolable by any lower unit.  Of course, the excuse is that the provincial state has a reality prior to the federal state, but morally speaking beyond this technicality, it's simply a way to shove a Québec identity down the throats of territorially contiguous elements in Québec who do not want it.  Of course, this accusation should sound awfully familiar.

Interestingly, he says,

Les conditions étant réunies pour que le référendum se tienne avec toute la sérénité souhaitable, le gouvernement déclenchera une campagne référendaire de courte durée en réalisant une vingt-septième action souveraine. Il fera adopter par l'Assemblée nationale une question référendaire courte, simple et claire : voulez-vous que le Québec devienne un pays souverain ?

In this case, he implicitly accepts the argument that the referendum question hasn't been clear in the past, and thus should be made clear and simple for the next referendum: should Québec become a sovereign country?  (Of course, there are semantic games to be played with the word "sovereign" that I have discussed earlier.)  This is laudable, and it would be more so if he hadn't decided in an earlier part of the article that the Québec government should propose a post-sovereignty partnership arrangement well in advance (and presumably act on it).  However, he is willing to accept the increased risk that citizens will reject his project if it isn't explicitly made clear in the question that sovereignty-association is the preferred form of the relationship.

And upon a win for the yes, he outlines a list of priorities that should be very rapidly settled, one of which is:

- négocier rapidement avec le gouvernement canadien, en échange de la prise en charge d'une partie du service de sa dette, une reconnaissance de l'indépendance, un partage équitable du patrimoine commun, la libre circulation des biens et des personnes entre les deux pays et un appui à l'adhésion du Québec à la zone de libre-échange nord-américaine.

Essentially, he implies that assuming a share of the Canadian debt is optional, and thus can be used as a bargaining chip at the table to...coerce?...a favorable settlement out of the ROC.  Charitably, he believes that there should be an "equitable" sharing of the common heritage of both parties.  He glosses over the likelihood, however, that he won't be negotiating with a Canadian state, but with provincial governments as well, who will all naturally seek a seat at the table...sound familiar?  Naturally, he cannot but gloss over this fact, as Québec is already not a province, but a nation, and so discussion of provinces is necessarily irrelevant to him.

Finally he finishes up with a ritual declaration about how convinced he is that this plan is the plan to succeed in obtaining an independent Québec, and that his leaders should implement it forthwith.

Now, of course, my readers should have by now seen a general theme in all of this: that Québec independence is best achieved by presupposing it; in other words, presenting to voters a fait accompli.  On the surface, the strategy makes sense. Since wavering or federalist voters are, he probably believes, only wavering because of uncertainty in the form of the independence project, naturally they would choose it if it were made clear what it is by example.  (This also has the salutary side-benefit of making it difficult to back out of the situation on a "no".)  To use a famous phrase, put the lobsters already in the trap.  Given that referenda are now considered to be the only way for Québec to achieve independence, he feels no need to consider the actual legitimacy of building a country on a strategy based, essentially, on turning the referendum into a rubber stamp.   But since 1982 was a form of oppression, an independent state was legitimate prior to this anyway: it is only a matter of realizing it.

There is an obvious problem I see in this strategy taken in its complete form.  It is the conventional wisdom, generally confirmed by observation, that Québec voters become less sovereigntist the more the provincial government acts like a nation.  It's quite possible (even likely) that this strategy could backfire and increase voters' confidence in keeping their identity intact within Canada.  Secondly, it uses sovereignty and independence interchangeably, and presupposes that ordinary society in Québec have no "brand loyalty" whatsoever to Canada; but this is belied by surveys showing that even among sovereigntists, the preference is to remain, in some form, attached to a Canadian entity.  This strategy only works if one conceives of the break as a rupture, which the author clearly does, making him an independantist, not exactly a sovereigntist.   Lastly, it presupposes that Adscam will continue to be relevant for the next several years, and it assumes that at the voting booth, Québécois will be willing to make an embezzlement scandal the basis of their motives for independence.

It will be interesting to see if anyone responds to the article in the francophone media.  But there is no one, alas, to respond, as they are all tainted by association with the federal or the unpopular provincial Liberals.

Comments

[Walsingham]

As usual, good writing and analysis. A few observations though:

First, I think a lot of what you say is really along the lines of: "Geez: it just isn't reasonable for this Quebecer, or other Quebecers, to act or think like this!" That this may be your point of view; that it may be others' point of view - within or without Quebec; or even that it may be "right"; is really beside the point. This may be really stretching the argument - and no other parallels are intended - but it reminds me a little bit of Don Rumsfeld in March, 2003, after two days of bombing Baghdad, almost exploding in frustration that the Saddamites weren't reporting to the nearest US embasssy to surrender. "Don't you understand: your resistance doesn't make sense!"

The thing is: this is the way people feel, and the despicable, under-handed way in which the Liberals have subverted legitimate argument and process in Quebec - and now have been caught doing so - weakens support among "the reasonable" (in your view) and further inflames the separatists. And without any very good reason to believe that a real change is around the corner, who can blame them? Or more precisely put, who has the heart? I know you do, Mandos, and more credit to you I suppose; but I have trouble. I know you are attempting to put the "reasons despite" across - again, I must say, to your credit - but I think you would do better to attempt to convince Quebecers, not that they have reasons not to separate; but rather, that they have reasons to stay.

The other conclusion that I have trouble backing you on, is your insistence that the PQ view that Quebec shall be indivisable, is abject hypocrisy. Of course, at some immediate, philosophical level, it is precisely that. However, it is also emminently - and even indispensably - practical. The moment of separation, if it comes, is bound to be a hot one. If the separatists were to agree beforehand to permit arbitrary fracture of their terrirory at that moment, then they would have no idea what they would be walking away with, and they would be unable to assure any kind of governance in the aftermath. It would be one thing for them to consider allowing the departure of regions at some later time - and were they to refuse to do so indefinitely, then they would indeed be guilty of the hyposcirsy you cite - but for them to insist that they will not allow it at the moment of their own departure from Canada, is not at all unreasonable.

[Walsingham]

Please pardon the errors of spelling above: they were typos (but still embarrassing...)

[Mandos]

No need to apologize for typos. You are human, and I am a Vala in human aspect.

"This may be really stretching the argument - and no other parallels are intended - but it reminds me a little bit of Don Rumsfeld in March, 2003, after two days of bombing Baghdad, almost exploding in frustration that the Saddamites weren't reporting to the nearest US embasssy to surrender. "Don't you understand: your resistance doesn't make sense!""

Strategically, the Baathists response may *not* have made sense. Politically neither of them did. It's true that I argue in terms of what I think *ought* to happen. I have, in a few earlier posts, discussed Québec separatism in terms of the sense they have of their nation, and in terms of erroneous conceptions of sovereigntism common in the ROC.

In this case, I am specifically dealing with the editor of Le Devoir. I am not attacking Québec nationalists as a whole. He presented a strategy for realizing Québec independence based on a similar premise to the one of which you are accusing me of starting: that Québecois have shown insufficient enthusiasm for independence, and hence particular tools must be employed to convince them. I am not focusing the major part of my critique on his motives for wanting independence himself (though I allude to this from time to time); I am criticizing the assumptions he makes in developing this strategy, and noticing implications that he does not acknowledge about his plan, as well as assessing its feasibility.

"I know you do, Mandos, and more credit to you I suppose; but I have trouble. I know you are attempting to put the "reasons despite" across - again, I must say, to your credit - but I think you would do better to attempt to convince Quebecers, not that they have reasons not to separate; but rather, that they have reasons to stay."

In the context of this article, Graveline already decided to separate a long time ago; he is merely discussing strategy to capitalize on a recent situation and conflating Adscam with practically everything that he considers to be an insult.

In the larger context, I support the notion that people who propose a change to a situation have to provide a reason for that change. Is Adscam enough? Well, even if it is, sovereigntism existed prior to it. There are conditions I would consider to be grounds for sovereignty. I'm not sure Adscam has reached that point.

Do not take it that I am diametrically opposed or unsympathetic to many of the goals of the sovereigntists. There is another factor driving support for Yes beyond Adscam, and that is the disaster of Charest. He is seen as, in favour of Canada, willing to dismember cherished legacies and tendencies from the Quiet Revolution. I simply don't believe that sovereignty is the solution to this, but federalism is guilty by association with him and the way he choose to go about implementing his policy preferences.

"If the separatists were to agree beforehand to permit arbitrary fracture of their terrirory at that moment, then they would have no idea what they would be walking away with, and they would be unable to assure any kind of governance in the aftermath. It would be one thing for them to consider allowing the departure of regions at some later time - and were they to refuse to do so indefinitely, then they would indeed be guilty of the hyposcirsy you cite - but for them to insist that they will not allow it at the moment of their own departure from Canada, is not at all unreasonable."

Here is the problem: any future fracture of the territory would still likely be deemed a response to Québec independence. In fact, this is my general problem with separatism as a form of nation-fulfillment: you are forced to demote other identities on that territory.

If Graveline had phrased it in terms of establishing a stable status prior to sovereignty, then it would have been reasonable. But he phrases it in terms of the discussion prior to a vote. Perhaps you are right and what he really meant was to prevent Westmount folk from setting up barricades and declaring themselves a part of Ontario or something during the campaign, which would be harmful to social peace, I agree.

But believe me, I have discussed this issue a number of times with Québec nationalists. And they are usually firm that everyone who lives on the soil of Québec is a Québécois, whether they like it or not (with the possible exception of the First Nations). That is because all other identifications are just that; Québec, however, is a Nation. In order to merit like consideration, these other identities would have also be Nations. How do we define "Nation"? By what Québec is...(and they charitably extend this to the ROC whether it wants it or not).

[Walsingham]

"In the larger context, I support the notion that people who propose a change to a situation have to provide a reason for that change. Is Adscam enough? Well, even if it is, sovereigntism existed prior to it. There are conditions I would consider to be grounds for sovereignty. I'm not sure Adscam has reached that point."

You are saying that Adscam is not reasonably enough by itself to warrant leaving Canada - fine, I will stipulate. But you are also saying that motivations for sovereignty existed before Adscam. So perhaps some might view Adscam-plus-May 19th as a sort of "straw that broke..." - or even, a tipping point of sorts? You may not think so, but I think you CAN understand why others just might. What Adscam-plus-May 19th signals to many people is that: (a) the Liberals will resort to anything to "influence" (being charitable there) others' thinking about their own future; (b) the Liberals are manifestly corrupt and untrustworthy - and hence, intrinsically disposed to govern in a manner that many cannot accept; (c) the Liberals are apparently in power for good, no matter what they are caught doing.

I'd say that people need to see that there is a realistic possibility that at least two of these three things will change, before we can expect them to "tip back". And I'd further say that it is simply rational at this point for people to assume that no such changes will be forthcoming, and to be acting accordingly.

I read yesterday that at least one Liberal MP has declared the Grewal affair something of a tipping point of his own. This MP was demanding that the Liberals start cleaning up their act, and getting rid of people like Murphy and Dosanjh, no matter how rotten Grewal may himself be in the matter. The obvious heartfelt anger and disgust with his own party that was evident in this MP's language, was the most encouraging thing I've come across since May 19th. Who knows, maybe there is hope. But as they say, hope springs eternal - we'll see. I do not believe that the Liberals can really change at this point.

[Mandos]

Let's put these things in perspective. For at least 40% of the Québecois population, the "tipping point" either occurred in the 1960s, or in 1982, or in the early 90s. That means that at most 12% (depending on the day) of sovereigntist support comes from the sponsorship scandal. Now, a certain number of that comes from offense at the sponsorship programme itself (minus Adscam). Actually, it comes from the general frustration at the ideological refusal to look at constitutional issues after 1982 whose physical embodiment is Jean Chrétien. ("...ghost of 1982, rattling his chains...") This brings it up to 48%.

So if we are looking at a tipping point, we are looking at an Adscam-based tipping point for something like 4% of the Québec population, seeing as surveys these days put Yes at 52ish%, sometimes higher, sometimes lower.

Graveline makes very little reference to frustration in Québec brought forward by Adscam. The matter of Adscam is actually peripheral to him, even though it forms the context of his strategy. Even if Adscam had never happened, he would still advocate subtracting Québec from Canada, because the insult happened well before that, and it has little itself to do with corruption.

What he is proposing, though, is that Adscam has changed the *tactical* situation regarding sovereignty. It has no effect on the legitimacy or necessity of the sovereigntist project; it has an effect making certain tactics more and less legitimate. It is seizing the opportunity of displeasure at the Liberals to make use of tactics that are similar to that of the Liberals. That is what is interesting about his proposal.

Secondly, I think you are transposing CPC frustration with never being able to unseat the Liberals (in this FPTP electoral system...) onto Québec nationalism. It's tempting, but the parallels are not that clear. You talk about unseating the Liberals, but the average Québécois voter is not so interested in doing that---or else, they wouldn't vote Bloc, or they'd demand that the Bloc runs seats everywhere (and I think it would be fairly successful if it did, but it never will). In fact with a few exceptions the least bad option is a Liberal minority, a situation that can be enforced by voting Bloc. A governmental change to the CPC, while superficially being provincialist, has other alienating factors, like the widespread belief that the CPC would have led us into the Iraq war.

And Jean Chrétien's shiningest moment in Québec (and in fact the most recent event that gave Québec the most reason to be proud of being in Canada) is his choice not to join the Coalition of the Shilling.