Pierre Graveline, the editor of Le Devoir, a staunch sovereigntist, published yesterday and today a two-part open letter to Duceppe and Landry regarding his 30-step, 10-priority programme for capitalising on Adscam and leading, ultimately, to a separate Québec. Some of the proposals are very interesting. Here's some exceprts from the first part of the article that I think are quite instructive.
Le Devoir: Lettre ouverte à Gilles Duceppe et Bernard Landry - Dix priorités et 30 actions souveraines - 1:Troisième action souveraine, deux mandats seront confiés aux ministres :
- créer au sein de chaque ministère, organisme public ou société
d'État un secrétariat à la souveraineté et libérer à cette fin des
ressources substantielles;
- élaborer en priorité des plans d'action prévoyant, sans égard à
la répartition des pouvoirs constitutionnels, les interventions à faire
pour répondre aux besoins du Québec, établissant les budgets
nécessaires et ciblant les lois et les mesures à mettre en application
dès la proclamation de l'indépendance.
This appears under the first priority, and is the third "sovereign action" of a putative next PQ government (quite likely due to the depths of Charest's unpopularity): fully using the resources of the Québec state apparatus in order to fulfill the objective. In this case, he plans to establish, as soon as possible, offices within every ministry to use public funds to promote sovereignty and set up the ministries to accomodate and assume a sovereign Québec. Later,
En conséquence, le gouvernement réalisera une
neuvième action souveraine. Il annoncera que le Québec se retire de
toutes les instances politiques fédérales-provinciales existantes (sauf
le Parlement fédéral, où les députés du Bloc resteront en fonction) et
qu'il entend désormais ne discuter que de nation à nation avec le
Canada, dans le cadre de rencontres entre les deux premiers ministres.
Cette décision fera l'objet d'une résolution de l'Assemblée nationale
afin de lui donner la portée politique qu'elle mérite.
So long as Québec is a part of Canada, dealing with the federal government will be unavoidable, he recognizes. But this must be done on a nation-to-nation basis. In other words, in the interim before sovereignty, he would impose on the other provinces what wasn't accepted at Meech: their effective relative demotion in federal-provincial affairs. Obviously, any potential backlash from this is a feature, not a bug. Québec should immediately cease to participate in any federal-provincial initiatives. This is because of the "oppression" of federal interference in what he believes should be the powers of Québec, which he mentions slightly earlier---any possibility of the practical efficacy of such arrangements is simply not considered. Of course, he must consider this encroachment to be absolute, since he does not even recognize the Constitution of 1982---obviously. Later, he moves on to such things as already setting up diplomatic recognition of Québec presumably long before Québec is sovereign.
And in the second part of the article:
Le Devoir: Lettre ouverte à Gilles Duceppe et Bernard Landry - Dix priorités et 30 actions souveraines - 2: Le gouvernement réalisera aussi une vingt-deuxième action
souveraine en créant un bureau d'information publique sur la
souveraineté et en le dotant du budget nécessaire pour communiquer
directement aux citoyens l'information pertinente sur les actions
gouvernementales préparant la souveraineté. Le bureau subventionnera
également les activités de la coalition citoyenne pour la souveraineté.
Vingt-troisième action souveraine, le gouvernement confiera au même
bureau le mandat de mener à bien une campagne d'information
internationale sur la souveraineté du Québec.
Enfin, vingt-quatrième action souveraine, la coalition citoyenne
lancera un hebdomadaire souverainiste à grand tirage. Subventionné par
l'État québécois, par ses organismes et ses sociétés, mettant à
contribution les figures de proue du mouvement souverainiste, cet outil
d'information contribuera puissamment à contrebalancer l'influence des
médias fédéralistes.
This part of the plan is very interesting. It proposes...a sponsorship programme. Of course, the entire article is cast in the context of Adscam: the federal government is willing to go to any lengths to subvert democracy in Québec, so a PQ "provincial" government must be willing to respond in kind. The irony of this is that the justification of the sponsorship programme (leaving out Adscam) is precisely that under any Québec government, nationalists use the apparatus of the state to negate the possibility of a Canadian identity for Québécois.
But this proposal is much more far-reaching than the federal sponsorship programme: it actually involves setting up potemkin sovereigntist media. This is proposed under the assumption that the media in Québec is overwhelmingly federalist. This proposition is regularly disputed by federalists in Québec, possibly correctly. In fact, this was yet again another justification for the federal sponsorship programme. And, of course, he is the editor of Le Devoir.
Though he complains about "oppression," (in the administrative encroachments of the federal government, he says,
De plus, en vue de prémunir la démocratie québécoise contre toute
tentative de déstabilisation, le gouvernement réalisera une
vingt-sixième action souveraine en déclarant, à la veille de la
campagne référendaire, que, tout en respectant strictement la liberté
d'expression des citoyens, il ne tolérera aucune action mettant en
danger la paix sociale, mettant en péril l'économie québécoise ou
mettant en cause l'intégrité territoriale du Québec. Il donnera mandat
à la Sûreté du Québec d'agir en conséquence.
Fine, he is against putting social peace in danger. But even as he says that he is in favour of free expression during a referendum campaign, he would make it illegal to threaten the territorial integrity of Québec during the campaign. This is obviously intended to threaten communities in Québec that see Canada as their nation and would choose the option to stay with it if Québec goes. This is one of the characteristics of the sovereigntist movement that I am least impressed by: they complain of the encroachment of the federal state, but as soon as they have control over the provincial state, well, that is inviolable by any lower unit. Of course, the excuse is that the provincial state has a reality prior to the federal state, but morally speaking beyond this technicality, it's simply a way to shove a Québec identity down the throats of territorially contiguous elements in Québec who do not want it. Of course, this accusation should sound awfully familiar.
Interestingly, he says,
Les conditions étant réunies pour que le référendum
se tienne avec toute la sérénité souhaitable, le gouvernement
déclenchera une campagne référendaire de courte durée en réalisant une
vingt-septième action souveraine. Il fera adopter par l'Assemblée
nationale une question référendaire courte, simple et claire :
voulez-vous que le Québec devienne un pays souverain ?
In this case, he implicitly accepts the argument that the referendum question hasn't been clear in the past, and thus should be made clear and simple for the next referendum: should Québec become a sovereign country? (Of course, there are semantic games to be played with the word "sovereign" that I have discussed earlier.) This is laudable, and it would be more so if he hadn't decided in an earlier part of the article that the Québec government should propose a post-sovereignty partnership arrangement well in advance (and presumably act on it). However, he is willing to accept the increased risk that citizens will reject his project if it isn't explicitly made clear in the question that sovereignty-association is the preferred form of the relationship.
And upon a win for the yes, he outlines a list of priorities that should be very rapidly settled, one of which is:
- négocier rapidement avec le gouvernement canadien,
en échange de la prise en charge d'une partie du service de sa dette,
une reconnaissance de l'indépendance, un partage équitable du
patrimoine commun, la libre circulation des biens et des personnes
entre les deux pays et un appui à l'adhésion du Québec à la zone de
libre-échange nord-américaine.
Essentially, he implies that assuming a share of the Canadian debt is optional, and thus can be used as a bargaining chip at the table to...coerce?...a favorable settlement out of the ROC. Charitably, he believes that there should be an "equitable" sharing of the common heritage of both parties. He glosses over the likelihood, however, that he won't be negotiating with a Canadian state, but with provincial governments as well, who will all naturally seek a seat at the table...sound familiar? Naturally, he cannot but gloss over this fact, as Québec is already not a province, but a nation, and so discussion of provinces is necessarily irrelevant to him.
Finally he finishes up with a ritual declaration about how convinced he is that this plan is the plan to succeed in obtaining an independent Québec, and that his leaders should implement it forthwith.
Now, of course, my readers should have by now seen a general theme in all of this: that Québec independence is best achieved by presupposing it; in other words, presenting to voters a fait accompli. On the surface, the strategy makes sense. Since wavering or federalist voters are, he probably believes, only wavering because of uncertainty in the form of the independence project, naturally they would choose it if it were made clear what it is by example. (This also has the salutary side-benefit of making it difficult to back out of the situation on a "no".) To use a famous phrase, put the lobsters already in the trap. Given that referenda are now considered to be the only way for Québec to achieve independence, he feels no need to consider the actual legitimacy of building a country on a strategy based, essentially, on turning the referendum into a rubber stamp. But since 1982 was a form of oppression, an independent state was legitimate prior to this anyway: it is only a matter of realizing it.
There is an obvious problem I see in this strategy taken in its complete form. It is the conventional wisdom, generally confirmed by observation, that Québec voters become less sovereigntist the more the provincial government acts like a nation. It's quite possible (even likely) that this strategy could backfire and increase voters' confidence in keeping their identity intact within Canada. Secondly, it uses sovereignty and independence interchangeably, and presupposes that ordinary society in Québec have no "brand loyalty" whatsoever to Canada; but this is belied by surveys showing that even among sovereigntists, the preference is to remain, in some form, attached to a Canadian entity. This strategy only works if one conceives of the break as a rupture, which the author clearly does, making him an independantist, not exactly a sovereigntist. Lastly, it presupposes that Adscam will continue to be relevant for the next several years, and it assumes that at the voting booth, Québécois will be willing to make an embezzlement scandal the basis of their motives for independence.
It will be interesting to see if anyone responds to the article in the francophone media. But there is no one, alas, to respond, as they are all tainted by association with the federal or the unpopular provincial Liberals.
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